How to Launch Without FIPS — Risks, Workarounds, and Best Practices

Launch Without FIPS? Compliance Alternatives and Security Trade-offsFIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards), specifically FIPS 140-2 and the newer FIPS 140-3, define security requirements for cryptographic modules used by U.S. federal agencies and many regulated industries. But many teams face practical pressures — tight deadlines, legacy environments, or third-party software incompatibilities — that make a FIPS-certified deployment impractical at launch. This article explores viable alternatives, the security trade-offs involved, and practical guidance for launching without FIPS while minimizing risk and preparing for future compliance.

Why Teams Consider Launching Without FIPS

• Time-to-market pressure: Obtaining FIPS-certified cryptographic modules and validating an entire system can take months.
• Legacy and third-party dependencies: Some libraries or hardware components used across the stack may lack FIPS-compliant builds.
• Cost and complexity: Certification, testing, and process changes add financial and operational overhead.
• Scope and applicability: Not every system or customer requires strict FIPS compliance; startups and consumer services often prioritize other obligations (e.g., GDPR, PCI-DSS).

If your organization does not have an explicit contractual or regulatory requirement to be FIPS-compliant at day one, launching without FIPS can be an acceptable business decision — provided you manage the security trade-offs consciously.

Key Security Trade-offs When Skipping FIPS

• Cryptographic assurance: FIPS certification provides an independent level of assurance about the correct implementation of cryptographic algorithms and random number generation. Without it, you rely on vendor claims and internal testing.
• Algorithm and module validation: Non-FIPS builds may allow deprecated or weak algorithms to be used by default (e.g., older TLS ciphers, weaker RNGs).
• Interoperability and trust: Some government or enterprise customers will not accept non-FIPS deployments, limiting market access.
• Auditability: FIPS environments usually have stronger controls and documentation expectations; skipping them can increase audit risk later.
• Upgradability complexity: Retroactively enabling FIPS (or migrating to FIPS-certified modules) may require architectural changes, downtime, or re-certification of integrations.

Compliance Alternatives and Complementary Controls

If you can’t use FIPS at launch, adopt layered compensating controls to reduce risk and demonstrate due care.

• Use well-regarded cryptographic libraries and keep them up to date

  • Examples: OpenSSL (modern versions), BoringSSL, LibreSSL, libsodium, Microsoft CNG, Java’s JCE with vetted providers.
  • Configure builds to disable weak ciphers, enable forward secrecy (ECDHE), and use TLS 1.2+ or TLS 1.3 only.

• Enforce strong cryptographic configurations by policy and automation

  • Harden TLS configurations using tools like Mozilla’s TLS guidelines or automated scanners (testssl.sh, SSL Labs).
  • Use configuration-as-code and CI checks to prevent regressions.

• Use hardware-backed key storage and HSMs (even if not FIPS-validated)

  • Cloud KMS (AWS KMS, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault) or on-prem HSMs improve key protection boundaries.
  • Consider posting a path for later migration to a FIPS 140-⁄₃ validated HSM.

• Strong operational security and access controls

  • Least privilege, role-based access control (RBAC), secrets rotation, multi-factor authentication (MFA) for privileged users.
  • Logging, centralized SIEM, anomaly detection.

• Cryptographic agility and isolation layers

  • Design systems so cryptographic providers are abstracted behind interfaces. That makes swapping to a FIPS-certified module easier later.
  • Encapsulate key operations inside services (KMS-as-a-service) so only a small surface needs FIPS compliance later.

• Continuous testing and validation

  • Penetration testing, fuzzing of crypto-related code paths, and regular dependency vulnerability scans.
  • Use deterministically reproducible builds to reduce supply-chain risk.

• Clear documentation and risk acceptance statements

  • Document why FIPS was not used, what compensating controls exist, and an explicit remediation timeline if required by stakeholders or auditors.

A Practical Roadmap: Launch Now, Certify Later

1. Assess scope and requirements
   • Identify which components would need FIPS validation for compliance (e.g., encryption at rest, TLS endpoints, authentication tokens).
2. Design for modularity
   • Implement a cryptography abstraction layer so you can substitute providers with minimal changes.
3. Choose strong, reputable crypto libraries and lock configurations
   • Pin versions, disable weak algorithms, enable TLS 1.⁄₁.3 only, require AEAD ciphers (e.g., AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305).
4. Use hardware-backed key storage with a migration plan
   • If using cloud KMS, plan how to move keys or point to a FIPS-validated HSM later.
5. Implement compensating controls and document them
   • RBAC, MFA, monitoring, rotation policies, incident response playbooks.
6. Validate internally and externally
   • Code reviews, static analysis, pen tests, third-party audits focused on cryptography and key management.
7. Communicate with stakeholders and set a timeline for FIPS if required
   • Provide customers/regulators with a remediation plan and milestones.
8. Execute certification path when ready
   • Choose whether to validate libraries, modules, or hardware, and budget time for testing and paperwork.

Example Configuration Checklist (Non-FIPS Launch)

• TLS: Enforce TLS 1.3 where possible; if TLS 1.2 is needed, restrict to strong ciphers (ECDHE + AES-GCM/ChaCha20).
• Certificates: Use widely trusted CAs, short-lived certificates where feasible, and automate renewal.
• Randomness: Use the OS CSPRNG (e.g., /dev/urandom on modern kernels); document OS versions and patches.
• Key management: Keys in cloud KMS or HSM; no hard-coded keys or secrets in code.
• Storage: Encrypt sensitive data at rest using authenticated encryption keys managed by KMS.
• Logging: Redact secrets, centralize logs, enable immutable storage for forensic needs.
• DevOps: CI/CD pipeline scans for secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, and misconfigurations.

When Launching Without FIPS Is NOT Acceptable

• Contracts or regulations explicitly require FIPS-certified modules (e.g., certain federal systems or vendors).
• Customers explicitly demand FIPS certification as a contractual condition.
• Systems handling classified data or regulated under frameworks that mandate FIPS.
  In those cases, do not launch without a clear, approved exception and a strict migration plan.

Communicating Risk Internally and to Customers

Be transparent: provide a concise risk statement, list compensating controls, and a timeline for remediation. Example bullet points for stakeholder briefings:

• What we are not doing: launching without FIPS-certified crypto modules.
• Why: timeline/technical constraints and business impact if delayed.
• What we are doing instead: list of compensating controls (KMS/HSM, hardened TLS, RBAC, pen tests).
• Remediation plan: target dates for validation/migration, resource needs, and expected customer impacts.

Conclusion

Launching without FIPS can be a pragmatic choice when time, cost, or technical constraints make immediate certification impractical. The decision should be deliberate, documented, and paired with strong compensating controls, cryptographic agility, and a clear remediation path. That approach lets teams get products into users’ hands quickly while preserving the option to meet stricter compliance requirements later.

If you want, I can: (1) draft a short risk statement for stakeholders, (2) produce a migration plan to FIPS 140-3 (timeline and milestones), or (3) generate hardened TLS and crypto configuration snippets for common platforms (OpenSSL, Java, Go). Which would help most?